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A REAPPRAISAL OF APPRAISAL STATUTES*
Norman D. Lattin t

T

WO recent cases, under two of the most carefully framed corporation statutes, have raised again the question of what to do with the
shareholder who dissents from fundamental change in his corporation.
The appraisal statutes were devised to meet this problem by giving the
shareholder, in the limited number of fundamental changes stated in
the statute, the right to demand the fair, cash or market value of his
share and retire from the company. The statutes of two states have
given him this right as almost the exclusive means of protecting his
interest in the company if he is dissatisfied with what the majority
shareholders have done.1 The remaining statutes have left available,
at least inferentially,. equitable remedies which existed before these
special statutes were framed.2 It is the intent of the writer to examine
the two cases mentioned, to explore possible paths toward solution, and
to suggest a way out.

Beechwood Securities Corporation, Inc. v. Associated
Oil Company 8
The California statute provides for appraisal of dissenting shares
only in cases of merger and consolidation.4 The remedy thus given is
exclusive, as specifically stated in the statute, except that the share-

*

The author is indebted to Professor Henry W. Ballantine of the University
of California School of Jurisprudence for helpful suggestions, some of which are
incorporated herein.
Professor of Law, Ohio State University; A.B., Colby; J.D., Michigan; S.J.D.,
Harvard. Co-author with Henry W. Ballantine, "Cases and Materials on Corporations"
(1939). Author of various articles in legal periodicals.-Ed.
1
Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937), § 369 (17); Mich. Pub. Laws (1931), No.
327, §§ 44, 54.
2
The Ohio court has quite rightly said that "The remedies provided under
statutes similar to Section 8623-72 [ the appraisal section], General Code, were never
considered exclusive. • • • In instances where fraud and illegality are involved it was
never intended that the statutory remedy should be exclusive." Johnson v. Lamprecht,
133 Ohio St. 567 at 578, 15 N. E. (2d) 127 (1938). This has been the usual view.
8
(C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 537·
4
Professor Henry W. Ballantine, draftsman of the California act, and Mr. Graham
Lee Sterling, Jr., have suggested that "An interesting legislative problem is whether
the remedy provided for dissenting shareholders under section 369 with its limitations
should be extended to shareholders who dissent from the sale of the entire assets of a
corporation, or even to amendments changing preferential rights." Ballantine and
Sterling, "Upsetting Mergers and Consolidations: Alternative Remedies of Dissenting

t
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holder may litigate the question "whether the number of legal votes 5
of shareholders required by statute to authorize or approve the proposed action of the corporation has been given." 6 It seems clear from
this statement that the California legislative policy ( and the same may
be said of Michigan 1 ) is to discourage strike suits even though, in
doing so, innocent shareholders may be injured. That brings us to
Beechwood Securities Corporation, Inc. v. Associated Oil Company,8
the first case to arise under these provisions.
The Beechwood Securities Corporation, Inc., brought suit against
the Associated Oil Company, a California corporation in which the
plaintiff held stock, and others to set aside proceedings for the merger
of Associated and the Tide Water Oil Company, a corporation formed
under the laws of Delaware, into another Delaware corporation, the
Tide Water Associated Oil Company. The formal requirements of the
California merger statute had been satisfied. The Tidewater Associated
Oil Company of Delaware owned over ninety-eight per cent of the
outstanding shares of the Associated Oil Company and over ninetynine per cent of the outstanding shares of the Tidewater Oil Company,
while Beechwood held but two hundred sixty shares in the Associated
Oil Company. 9 There were other dissenting shareholders who claimed
under the appraisal provision but apparently none besides Beechwood
who cared to contest the validity of the merger.
Beechwood contended: (I) that the parent corporation as majority
shareholder occupied a fiduciary relation to the minority which made
the merger voidable at the will of any minority shareholder;
(2) that the statute authorizing the merger proceedings and abroITT,ting
all equitable remedies no matter what their foundation violated the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution in
Shareholders in California," 27 CAL.- L. REv. 644 at 672 (1939). They feel that
too much leeway in respect to the rights to demand an appraisal might be the means
of encouraging incorporators to use the Delaware law. Ibid., p. 672.
5 For an explanation of the term ''legal votes," see ibid., pp. 664-667.
6 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937), § 369 (17).
7 Mich. Pub. Laws (1931), No. 327, §§ 44, 54, both sections specifically stating
that the remedy by appraisal is his "exclusive remedy." It is not suggested that the
shareholder may even contest the number of votes as he may under the California
statute.
8 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 537·
9 Ballantine and Sterling, "Upsetting Mergers and Consolidations: Alternative
Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California," 27 CAL. L. REv. 644 at 652
(1939). Messrs. Ballantine and Sterling had access to all the facts in this case and
filed a brief as amici curiae in the case. The court speaks of "consolidation," but it is
obvious that "merger" is meant.
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talcing the property of the minority without due process of law; (3)
that, if the assumption was right that the cutting off of equitable remedies was void, the merger should be set aside, as the terms involving
the exchange of stock were unfair to the minority "in that the rate
of exchange ( two and .one-fourth shares in the surviving corporation for
one share in Associated) provided an inadequate equivalent for Associated shareholders as compared with Tidewater shareholders who
received three shares for one"; and ( 4) that the transaction was essentially a sale of assets under subterfuge of a merger and, since the sale
of assets section was not complied with the transaction should be set
aside. 10 The complaint was dismissed upon motion of Tidewater Associated, the federal district court agreeing with the contention that the
appraisal section gave an exclusive and adequate remedy.11 This dismissal was without leave to amend, which Beechwood had requested in
order "to make more certain the allegations of fraud, as set forth in
its brief." 12
The circuit court of appeals considered the case as if the amendment
asked for by Beechwood had been made, and reached the conclusion
that whether or not there was a fraudulently unfair exchange imposed
upon the minority, the legislature could "terminate a shareholder's
investment on payment of its then face value, if it so choose." 18 Said
the court through Denman, C. J.:
"In effect, these code sections, as construed by both parties,
say to a shareholder, 'When you buy stock in a California corporation you are advised that your associate shareholders holding
two-thirds of the shares may consolidate your corporation with
another into a third corporation, offer you what they please of its
shares in exchange for those you hold, and, if you do not like the
offer, may buy out your shares at their fair market value at the
time they vote the consolidation.'" 14
The court assumed that there was no "inherent right" of a shareholder to keep his investment in the merged corporation and that, when
he has received the treatment authorized by a statute of which he had
notice when he made his investment, there can be no basis for setting
aside the merger on the ground of fraud.
10

Ibid., at 652-653.
Ibid., at 654.
12
104 F. (2d) at 540.
18
Ibid., at 540. The California statute provides for the "fair market value" as the
standard. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937), § 369 (17).
14
104 F. (2d) 537 at 540.
11
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It is difficult to see how the court could have done otherwise under
a statute as clearly stated as this one. The legislative intent could not
have been more adequately disclosed. The practical problem of settling
differences between majority and minority at the earliest possible time,
the recognition of the fact that many minority a:ctions are strike actions,
and the feeling that one remedy through appraisal was adequate and
just, overbalanced ( at least in the minds of the· legislature) considerations of fair play and common honesty and the desire to make investments attractive to the investing public. One may quarrel with the
policy behind such a statute or with the assumption that the remedy
a:ff0rded is adequate and just,15 but not with the interpretation of the
legislative intent.
But what of the policy inherent in such sweeping legislation? ls it
good or bad? Are there dangers lurking within this absolute rule which
the legislature has seen fit to lay down? Messrs. Ballantine and Sterling, in a recent able article, have made as adequate a defense of it as
can be made.10 Their defense rests basically upon the assumption_ that
the usual minority threat or suit is for blackmail purposes, an assumption which the case material hardly supports and one upon which, so
far as the writer is informed, no figures have been compiled.11 They
emphasize the practical need, indeed necessity, of facilitating business
transactions and of permitting the majority to take full advantage of
their statutory powers. They point out the injustice of letting the
minority upset consummated mergers and consolidations where new
issues of stock have been distributed and new obligations incurred.
Equally solicitous are they for those of the minority who wish to have
15 "If the fair market value of the shares of the dissenter can be ascertained and
given, that would seem to be adequate relief and would avoid injustice to the majority
and also to other members of the minority." Ballantine and Sterling, "Upsetting Mergers and Consolidations: Alternative Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California,"
27 CAL. L. REv. 644 at 661 (1939).
·
Professor Ballantine, in a recent letter to the author, believes that the author has
overstated his case concerning the factors that influenced the legisature. He says: "The
legislature did not lay aside considerations of fair play and common honesty and the
protection of investments. It was making a choice of remedies with reference to a balance of policy in promoting fair play and common honesty and the making of investments attractive to the majority of the investors as against dangerous attacks by the
minority. It is a question of balance and the practical utility and working of the
remedies by way of injunction and rescission."
16 lbid.
17 lbid., at 645, 649, 651. The Clarence Venners may occasionally turn up (see
p. 649), but they are the exception rather than the rule. See Lattin, "Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority Stockholders," 30 M1cH.
L. REv. 645 (1932), for many illustrations of skullduggery by majority shareholders.
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their shares appraised and who may be held up by virtue of the suit
of a shareholder who prefers to see his corporation run along in the
old grooves. The suit to enjoin or to upset, they tell us, is an expensive one for all concerned and is uncertain at its best. Hence, with
paternalistic concern, we must conclude that the equitable remedy must
be superseded by appraisal.
The fact that such a suit is likely to be an expensive one for a losing
stockholder is the best protection possible against strike suits. That
majority action may be halted or, barring laches, may be upset with a
return to the status quo ante is a fair guarantee that the majority will
make efforts to deal justly in the exercise of the great powers which
the statute has delegated. The growing doctrine that places a somewhat modified fiduciary obligation upon any group within the corporation where that group has been given power to act is additional protection to the rest of the shareholders.18 The insistence of courts upon
prompt action by the dissenter before new shares have been issued to
innocent third parties and before new obligations have been incurred
adequately protects third-party interests. 19 This, in itself, is frequently
a barrier to minority attack along equitable lines, for the various statutes have provided for so short a notice to shareholders before the
meeting at which the contemplated action is to be voted upon that it is
impossible to obtain the necessary information to bring suit before new
and substantial interests have been affected by consummation of the
plan. 20 Add to these considerations the presumption that the judgment
18 See BERLE and MEANS, THE MODERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
247 et seq. (1932); Lattin, "Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers
Given to Majority Stockholders," 30 MxcH. L. REv. 645 (1932).
19 Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S. W. 155 (1904); Finch v. Warrior
Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, 141 A. 54 (1928); Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric
Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1906) 144 F. 765; Beling v. American Tobacco Co., 72 N. J. Eq.
32, 65 A. 725 (1907). On the question of what constitutes !aches, see recent case of
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940) II A. (2d) 331 at 343.
20 The California and Ohio acts are illustrative. In case of consolidation and
merger, a 20-day notice suffices. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937), § 361 (3). The
general provision for notice under. Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-44, applies
to sale of assets, merger and consolidation, amendments to articles and other important
meetings, and notice must be given "not more than forty-five days nor less than ten
days before such meeting, unless the articles or regulations [by-laws] permit or require shorter or longer notice."
"These notices, like those provided in connection with sales of assets and charter
amendments, fail to afford shareholders sufficient time and information to vote
intelligently on the proposed action. The explanation of this apparently shocking
inadequacy as to statutory notices no doubt is found partly in the fact that shareholders, by reason of inertia and preoccupation with other affairs, will seldom if ever
use an opportunity to take any interest or action in the matter even if sufficient time,
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of both the directors and the majority shareholders was formed in
good faith and that it was designed to further the best interests of the
corporation as a whole,21 and one has a rather complete picture of the
difficulties involved in upsetting any but clearly fraudulent action by
the majority.
.
Despite the above considerations designed to encourage honesty
and fair dealing in corporate matters, Messrs. Ballantine and Sterling
fear the threat of possible strike action by a trouble-maker who wants
to be bought off at the highest available figure. That the judgment of
the board and of the majority must, in the event of a suit to enjoin
or set aside, be pitted against the judgment of the shareholder bringing
suit is a source of much concern and some possible embarrassment in
the eyes of these authors. It need not be if all have acted fairly. While
there may be differences of opinion as to the price at which all or
substantially all of the assets are being sold, or as to the terms of a
merger or consolidation, or of an amendment that does violence to
outstanding shares, the fact remains that courts have supported majority action unless so unreasonable as to indicate an abuse of majority
powers. 22 This gives considerable leeway to legitimate action, as it
notice, and information are given. Moreover, short no~ices are necessary from the
practical viewpoint of enabling corporations to make proper underwriting arrangements
for merger securities, it being normally impossible to get underwriting commitments
for any great length of time. Such underwriting would ordinarily be necessary to insure
the success of the merger. 'Catching the market' is said to be one of the trickiest problems
in merger finance." Ballantine and Sterling, "Upsetting Mergers and Consolidations:
Alternative Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California," 27 CAL. L. REv. 644
at 646-647 (1939).
21 Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157 at 170, 142 A. 654
(1928): "When the majority of the stockholders speak for the corporation upon
extraordinary occasions as the directors do in the usual course of events, a like presumption in favor of the bona fides of their decision should prevail." See Ohio Gen. Code
(Page, Supp. 1940), § 8623-67 (VI), which provides: "An agreement of merger or
consolidation, when adopted in the manner prescribed in this section, shall in the
absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary be presumed to be fair and equitable in every respect to all shareholders."
22 A fair. example of this is in the setting of the price in case of a sale of the assets.
It is held that the majority may exercise reasonable judgment in fixing the price.
Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 141 A. 425 (1928); Jackson Co.
v. Gardiner Inv. Co., 133 C. C. A. (1st) 266, 217 F. 350 (1914), rehearing denied
133 C. C. A. (1st) 324,220 F. 297 (1915), appeal dismissed 239 U.S. 628, 36 S. Ct.
164 (1915). But see Outwater v. Public Service Corp. of New Jersey, 103 N. J. Eq.
461, 143 A. 729 (1928), decree affirmed 104 N. J. Eq. 490, 146 A. 916 (1929),
where, in a merger, the court said that the minority shareholders were not only entitled to fair exchange values for their shares but that they were also entitled to an
exchange carrying relative equality in the consolidated company. Compare Federal
United Corp. v. Havender, (Del. S. Ct. 1940) II A. (2d) 311, where the merger
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should, and ought not to frighten anyone, least of all the directors and
the majority, if their action has been designed to benefit the corporation and all shareholders in the company equally.
The California statute has left open one loophole which may be
useful even to those bringing strike actions if they act with promptness.
In summarizing the remedies available under this statute, Messrs.
Ballantine and Sterling assert that "Prior to the filing of the merger
or consolidation agreement, and certificates as to its approval, with
the secretary of state [ there is] the right to sue to enjoin the continuation of the merger or consolidation proceeding for failure to comply
with any one or more of the requirements of section 361, or for threatened fraud, prior to approval by the shareholders." 23 If a sufficient
time were required between the giving of notice to shareholders of
the time of meeting, and if a sufficiently detailed statement concerning
the proposed action were required, there could be little objection to the
statute. But if such a notice were required, there would still remain
the practical difficulty of accomplishing major operations without interference by some minority shareholder, and the writer suspects that this
would be objectionable to those who favor the California and Michigan
viewpoints. Admittedly a reasonably long notice to shareholders before
the meeting is held might, in some cases, be disadvantageous to the
corporation. However, it must be remembered that usually the board
has been deliberating for a considerable period over the contemplated
major change. When the plan finally emerges and is ready to be
plan was admitted to be fair and equitable but the right to accrued, undeclared dividends
in cash was destroyed.
23 Ballantine and Sterling, "Upsetting Mergers and Consolidations: Alternative
Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California," 27 CAL. L. REV. 644 at 667
(1939). While the authors point out several other possible remedies, it seems doubtful
whether they are of great practical importance. These are: "The right to institute an
action to test whether the number of legal votes of shareholders .•• required by statute
. . • have been given at a meeting duly called, and ancillary to such an action, the
right to enjoin the consummation of the merger or consolidation during the pendency
of the action." (This must occur prior to the filing of the merger or consolidation agreement, and certificates as to its approval, with the secretary of state.) Subsequent to the
filing, etc., these rights belong to the shareholders: ( l) To ask the attorney general
to bring an action in the name of the state to set aside the merger or consolidation
because there was noncompliance with the requirements of section 361; (2) to ask
the attorney general to bring an action in the name of the state to set aside the merger
or consolidation because the number of legal votes required were not obtained; (3) to
ask the attorney general to bring an action to dissolve the corporation in a proper case;
(4) the right to be paid the fair market value of his shares; and (5) the common-law
right to sue for damages for fraudulent procurement of the shareholder's vote or for
the conversion of his share. Ibid., pp. 667-668.
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presented to the shareholders for their consideration, it is a little
difficult to see why the shareholders should not be given a reasonable
time in which to study what the board has done in order to vote intelligently when the time arrives. The fact that many shareholders are
inactive and would not study the plan even though time were given is
no answer to this difficulty. The only answers available would seem
to be that time is of the essence in order to accomplish the result or that
the board and the majority do not want to be hampered by minority
obstructionism whether of an honest or a dishonest sort.24
There is one other great danger that the California and Michigan
statutes present now that the bars are down so that the majority can
proceed fraudulently if it so desires. Many shareholders, either due
to ignorance as to their right to demand an appraisal or to the seeming
futility of attempting to bring a suit to enjoin within the comparatively
short time in which one would be e:ffective, will be forced along with
the new enterprise despite its possible unfairness. It may even be that
otherwise wary and informed shareholders will be encouraged to accept what the majority sanctions by virtue of misrepresentations of that
majority through its officers. Of course, there will be, under such circumstances, a cause of action for damages caused by such misrepresentations, which, due to the same feeling of futility and because of the
expense, will perhaps discourage the shareholder from bringing suit.
A statutory requirement placing upon the corporation the duty of
notifying all shareholders that, under the particular circumstances,
they have the right to demand an appraisal, and setting out the formalities which have to be observed in order to obtain the appraisal,
would at least take care of those shareholders who are ignorant of their
rights of appraisal.
While some practical advantages have been gained by this type of
legislation, it seems questionable whether the sacrifice of honesty to
24 There has been evidenced a long development to avoid minority obstruction in
the various statutes permitting broad amendments to corporate charters. One of the most
recent attempts has been to wipe out accrued but undeclared dividends. Keller v. Wilson
& Co., (Del. S. Ct. 1936) 190 A. II5, and Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v.
Johnson, (Del. S. Ct. 1937) 197 A. 489, were but brief stopping points and did not
settle the whole problem. That lawyers had ingenuity to overcome the effect of these
decisions is illustrated in Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. E. (2d)
127 (1938), and Federal United Corp. v. Havender, (Del. S. Ct. 1940) II A. (2d)
331. When lawyers in Ohio saw which way the wind was blowing they submitted,
through the State Bar Association's Committee on Corporation Law, an amendment
that was promptly enacted into law and that specifically permits the destruction, by
proper vote, of accrued dividends. The dissenting shareholder, however, may demand
appraisal. Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1940), § 8623-14 (i).
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practicality is justified. As the present writer has tried to show, the
judicial checks and balances upon the prosecution of a strike suit are
so weighty that there is little danger of success except in clearly fraudulent action. And such action ought to be stopped at its source. While
there may be no inherent right in the shareholder to retain his investment, certainly no one will question the policy of encouraging security
in investments and honesty in corporate action where dishonesty may
undermine that security. There is too much danger, in these days when
investment returns are generally low, in forcing minorities out of
lucrative investments through the use of the several devices contained
in modern corporation statutes. That i~, the danger is there if there are
no restraining influences through the threat of equity powers. 24a A
wise public policy needs to encourage honesty even at the expense of
some inconvenience in carrying out major corporate policies.
Voeller v. N eilston T,Varehouse C ompawy n

Under the Ohio statute,26 unless the articles otherwise provide, a
shareholder who complies with the conditions precedent to appraisal is
entitled to appraisal in certain stated cases 27 when the articles have been
amended, when all or substantially all of the corporate property has
been authorized to be sold, leased, exchanged, or otherwise disposed
of, in merger or consolidation (if the shareholder is substantially
prejudiced),28 and upon reorganization. The shareholder must object
in writing to the action so taken and must demand in writing the payment of the fair cash value of his shares, this within twenty days after
the day on which the vote was taken; the statute also requires him to
state the number and kind of shares held by· him and the amount which
the shareholder claims is the fair cash value. The corporation must,
within ten days after the receipt of the demand, inform the shareholder
whether it will pay the demanded amount "and, if it refuses to pay
such amount, it shall offer in writing to pay an amount as and for such
24a The California Corporate Securities Act does provide administrative supervision
by requiring a permit from the Commissioner of Corporations. He is authorized to go
into the question of fairness of exchange of outstanding issues for new issues of securities. Cal. Stat. (1935), p. 835, § 4, unnumbered par. 2; Ballantine and Sterling,
"Upsetting Mergers and Consolidations: Alternative Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California," 27 CAL. L. REV. 644 at 669 (1939).
25 136 Ohio St. 427, 26 N. E. (2d) 442 (1940).
26 Ohio Gen. Code {Page, 1938), § 8623-72.
27 For example, see Ohio Gen. Code {Page, Supp. 1940), § 8623-14 (1), (2)
and (3).
28 Ibid., § 8623-67 (IV).
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fair cash value." 29 If there is disagreement as to the amount, a period
of six months is given in which either the corporation or the shareholder may petition the court of common pleas to determine the fair
cash value. If no petition is filed within that time, and if the corporation
has complied with the statute and has stated an amount which it considers the fair cash value, the statute raises a conclusive presumption
that the amount set by the corporation is the fair cash value. In the
absence of an offer by the corporation, the amount demanded by the
shareholder is, under the statute, likewise conclusively presumed to
be the fair cash value. 80 This provision places a very small burden
upon the corporation to disclose in writing what it considers the fair
cash value of the particular class of shares. After that, it may rest
and, upon the passage of the six months' period without suit for appraisal by the dissenter, it will immediately know that it need pay him
only the amount which it stated as the fair cash value.
There are also provisions in the Ohio statute which permit the
corporation to withdraw from the contemplated action without incurring the penalty of having to pay off those who have dissented.
Minute directions are also given concerning the procedures to be followed during the period when the appraisal is being made and before
the corporation is finally bound to pay the ascertained amount. st Shareholders who do not agree with the anticipated corporate change are
warned that if they do not object and demand in writing the payment
of the fair cash value of their shares in the manner provided for in this
section, they "shall be concluded by the vote of assenting shareholders." 82
Here is a simple procedure which attempts to solve the problem of
dissenting shareholders in a highly practical way. It provides for
finality at the earliest possible moment. All parties are as thoroughly
protected as need be. There is nothing in the section indicating that
fraud on the part of the majority will be tolerated, and this result need
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-72, unnumbered par. 5.
so Ibid.,§ 8623-72, par. 7.
81 Ibid., § 8623-72, par. 17.
82 Ibid.,§ 8623-72, par. 18. The court has in~icated, however, that the appraisal
remedy is not exclusive of equity relief. See Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St.
567 at 578, 15 N. E. (2d) 127 (1938); Goodisson v. North American Securities Co.,
40 Ohio App. 85, 178 N. E. 29 (1931); Wick v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,
46 Ohio App. 253, 188 N. E. 514 (1933); Vulcan Corp. v. Westheimer & Co., (Ohio
App. 1938) 27 Ohio L. Abs. 694, app. dismissed 135 Ohio St. 136, 19 N. E. (2d)
901 (1939). Compare Geiger v. American Seeding Machine Co., 124 Ohio St. 222
at 236, u7 N. E. 594 (1931); Smith v. Kroeger, (Ohio App. 1938) 28 Ohio L.
Abs. 38.
29
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not be reached if the court studies carefully the language which says
that a dissenter "shall be concluded by the vote of assenting shareholders" provided he has not properly objected and made demand
for appraisal.
Until the recent case of Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Company, 88
there was no suggestion that any part of this section was unconstitutional. In fact, the pronouncements in the courts were all to the effect
that the section was constitutional. 84 However, the specific question
whether the provision concerning the raising of a conclusive presumption of fair value was constitutional had not been raised.
In the Voeller case, better than two-thirds of the shareholders
decided to sell the main asset of the company, namely, the building in
which it carried on its business. 85 The plaintiffs complied with the conditions precedent to appraisal and payment, naming what they thought
to be the fair cash value of their shares. The corporation, by its president, wrote the plaintiffs stating, "Your demand for payment is refused. The purpose for which the N eilston Warehouse Company was
incorporated has been abandoned." 36 No statement was made of what
the corporation considered the fair cash value of the plaintiff's shares,
which statement the statute specifically requires. The plaintiffs waited
six months, during which time no one filed an action for appraisal, and
then filed suit for the amount the statute said was conclusively presumed to be the fair cash value. It was argued by the defendants that
the conclusive presumption feature of the statute was unconstitutional
as depriving the majority shareholders of property without due process
of law, in violation of section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution. The Ohio Supreme Court ( two judges dissenting)
held that this part of the statute was unconstitutional because it did not
88

136 Ohio St. 427, 26 N. E. (2d) 442 (1940).
Williams v. National Pump Corp., 46 Ohio App. 427, 188 N. E. 756 (1933);
Miller v. Canton Motor Coach, Inc., 58 Ohio App. 94, 16 N. E. (2d) 486 (1937),
app. dismissed 133 Ohio St. 384, 14 N. E. (2d) 15 (1938).
85
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-65, gives this power to those entitled
to exercise "at least two-thirds of the voting power," or a smaller proportion, not less
than a majority, if the articles so permit. In the Voeller case there were outstanding
5078 shares, of which 4783 were represented at the meeting. 3658 shares were voted
in favor of the sale, l l 2 5 against, 8 l 8 of the latter filing written objections and demands
for payment under Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-72. Appellants' (defendants') brief, p. 5.
36
Brief of appellees (plaintiffs), p. 7; brief of appellants (defendants), p. 5. It
seems obvious that the corporation ought to have voted in the first instance for a dissolution rather than for a sale of assets. Then there would have been no question about
dissenters as no right to appraisal is given in such cases.
84
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provide for notice to the majority shareholders of the demands of the
dissenters who desired to be paid off, nor was there any provision for
majority action if they, by chance, heard of the dissenters' demands
and desired to file suit to compel their corporation to act.37 Zimmerman, J., writing the opinion for the majority, assumed that "The
pecuniary _and personal interests of two opposing groups of stockholders
are primarily involved in a situation like the present one-the majority
who voted for the sale of the corporate property, and the minority
who did not so vote." 88 He pointed out _the fact that, after the shareholders' votes are taken, the statute confines the subsequent proceedings to the corporation and to the dissenting shareholders who have
demanded the fair cash value of their shares.39 He assumed, quite
correctly, that the board of directors ordinarily represents the corporation qua corporation and not any group of shareholders; that notice to
the board is not notice to the shareholders in a case where shareholders
themselves have the legal right to be given notice. But, assuming that
the majority shareholders had notice, argues Judge Zimmerman, or
that they were chargeable with notice of-the minority's demands, this
part of- the statute cannot stand, for the "statute does not provide for
action on the part of the majority; negotiations and resort to judicial
proceedings are limited to the corporation and the minority stockholders who have asserted themselves." He further assumed that a
representative suit was not possible during the six-month period, for "no
real detriment occurred to the majority until the expiration of the sixmonth period, when the conclusive presumption became absolute,
through the failure of the corporation or the demanding minority to
move." 40
By this decision Ohio lawyers representing either corporate clients
or dissenting shareholders will be in a complete fog as to what to do.
Will it be safe to act by giving all shareholders except those entitled to
·appraisal due notice that the dissenters are demanding so much for their
shares? Suppose those demanding appraisal are demanding different
amounts. Must they also be notified of what the others are demanding?
87 The ·dissenting judges di.ffered, in part, in their views. Hart, J., dissented
because he thought the defendants, having invoked the powers created by Ohio Gen.
Code, § 8623-65, to bring about a sale of corporate assets, were estopped to question
the constitutionality of § 8623-72, the two sections being, for practical purposes, one
and the same section. Myers, J., also agreed on this point but argued that the majority
judges were wrong in their finding that there was any lack of due process.
38 136 Ohio St. 427 at 432.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., at 43~, 433-434.
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What if some shareholder objects that the price demanded ought not
to be paid? Can the corporation proceed with negotiations and pay what
it deems to be the fair value if it agrees with the dissenter? According
to Judge Zimmerman, the shareholder who objects cannot get into
court before the end of the six-month period and then the statute has
established a conclusive presumption as to fair cash value. If the board
decides to give written notice to the dissenter of its valuation of the
shares, would not this be beyond the powers of the board unless it has
been authorized by all shareholders not entitled to appraisal? How
practical is it to require notice to be given to several thousand shareholders to obtain their consent before the board may act as agents in
this matter? If such notice be given and some shareholders fail to reply
or some refuse their consent, will it be safe for the board to proceed
when the court has so specifically said that this would be a taking of
property without due process? In the face of the court's assertion that
there must be notice to the shareholder and an opportunity to be heard,
would it be legally possible by less than a unanimous vote to amend
the corporate articles giving the board the power to represent all shareholders in the matter of appraisal under the appraisal section? These
are not academic questions but are extremely practical ones. They are
vitally important in a state as highly industrial and commercial as
Ohio.
It is believed that the court was under no necessity, either legally
or factually, to hold the Ohio statute unconstitutional. The brief of the
defendants asserted that if the plaintiffs were to win they would
receive approximately $roo ( the par value) for their shares whereas
the majority shareholders would receive but $13 per share. 41 This is
quite beside the point, but the court observed, "It might be well to
observe here that the per share amount demanded by the dissenting
stockholders as the fair cash value of their stock is appreciably greater
than the per share amount which will be received by other stockholders
upon distribution of the amount derived from the disposal of the corporate assets." 42Even if this were so, it is no different from any other
case where the board, with power to act, has acted negligently and
caused the corporation a large loss. The remedy in such cases is a cor41 Brief of appellants (defendants), p. 13. Reply brief ot appellants (defendants), p.
7. Brief of appellees (plaintiffs) denies this discrepancy. See p. 7. Appellees claimed
that not all the dissenters were entitled to payment, as many were estopped, and that
if those who were entitled to payment should be paid, the majority would be paid
but $4 per share less than they would have obtained if the property were distributed
pro rata among all shareholders. Pp. 7 and 8 of their brief.
42 136 Ohio St. 431.

1178

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

porate one against the directors for loss occasioned by negligent mismanagement and if the board, due to self interest, refuses to bring the
suit, any non-participating and non-consenting shareholder may bring
a derivative action. 48
Let us examine critically the court's analysis of the problem. The
court first assumed that "The pecuniary and personal interests of two
opposing groups of stockholders are primarily involved in a situation
like the present one-the majority who voted for the sale of the corporate property, and the minority who did not so vote." 44 This assumption cannot be sustained. The statute has made it most clearly a matter
between the corporation and the dissenter, except in so far as all
shareholders who properly qualify may vote upon the particular fundamental change which the board has recommended. The dissenter
must make his objection and state his demand to the corporation, not
to the majority; he may withdraw his demand with the consent of the
corporation and not of the majority; the corporation, not the majority,
must reply to his demand and state what it considers the fair cash value
of his share; upon the corporation, and not upon the majority, is the
burden of paying the appraised value if an appraisal is had and, if not,
it is the corporation which is made liable to the dissenter if it fails to
state what it considers the fair cash value and permits six months to
pass. By specific provision, the corporation has the power to seek an
appraisal as well as the dissenter-no mention is made of an appraisal
to be made on behalf of majority shareholders who may possibly disagree with what the corporation is doing in this matter. Judgment is
payable upon a surrender of the dissenter's shares to the corporation,
not to the majority. To the corporation is given the power to rescind
any vote authorizing the various fundamental changes before they have
been consummated, but the statute quite properly requires the rescission
to be effectuated by the same vote requisite to the original action now
sought to be rescinded/ 5
Since corporations are allowed to be formed and to function by
virtue of authority granted by the state, it seems obvious that the legislature can designate a method by which the shareholders may make
fundamental changes and provide procedures which will be binding
· upon the corporation and all its shareholders. If the majority disagrees
48 Citation of authority seems unnecessary. However, see BALLANTINE and LATTIN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 832-886 (1939).
44 136 Ohio St. 427 at 432.
.
45 All of this is contained in the various 19 unnumbered paragraphs of Ohio Gen.
Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-72.
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with the statutory method, it need not make the change. Furthermore,
it is basic that every part of the statute becomes a part of every shareholder's contract, and, for this reason alone, it follows that the appraisal
section and the procedures which it sets up are consented to by all shareholders. But even if we are compelled to argue as the court did and to
say that the majority shareholders must receive notice and must have
an opportunity to be heard, it can be realistically stated that the shareholders have, in advance of their action, consented (by virtue of this
part of the statute which is a part of their contract) to have the corporation, through its board and officers, represent them in the matter of
notice, payment, and the other things which the statute specifically says
are to be done by the corporation. The court laconically stated that
"It is well settled that the directors act as the corporation ... and that
they are in no sense personal representatives of the stockholders by
whose sufferance they hold office," 46 a statement which cannot be disputed. But it is quite as readily possible for the shareholders to appoint
the board to represent themselves or to consent that the board shall so
represent them in the matters pertaining to appraisal and payment of
dissenting shareholders' shares as it is to appoint other agents for other
purposes. And, while the writer does not believe that it is necessary
to argue this question on the basis of agency, yet since the court has
insisted upon notice and a hearing to the majority, in order to attain
constitutionality, a theory of agency is not only plausible but it is also
inherently sound.
The court further assumes that, even if the majority had notice of
the demands of the dissenters, and of the failure or refusal of the board
to act, the section would still be constitutionally invalid because of lack
of due process. The statute, says the court, does not provide for any
action by the majority. And the court assumes that "no real detriment
occurred to the majority until the expiration of the six-month period." 47
Inferentially, the court seems to be laying down a rule to the effect
that to justify a stockholder's suit there must be actual injury, rather
than threatened irreparable injury that will result if the shareholder is
not permitted to act in a representative capacity. The famous case of
Dodge v. W oolsey,4 8 which, it may be said, arose in Ohio, was a case
46

136 Ohio St. 427 at 432.
lbid., at 433.
48
18 How. (59 U.S.) 331 (1855). The recent case of Norman v. Consolidated
Edison Co. of New York, Inc., (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 619, cert. denied
300 U.S. 673, 57 S. Ct. 612 (1937), further clarifies this rule. Said the court: "That
we are right in saying that Dodge v. Woolsey relates to situations where the damage
47
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of threatened irreparable injury in the event that the board did not
act, and the board had refused to act. A stockholder was permitted to
bring a representative suit to enjoin the collection of an unconstitutional
tax that, if the directors had paid it as required by the statute, would.
have eventually resulted in "irreparable mischief to the corporation"
and to the shareholders' interest. In the Voeller case, as the court argues
it, there would be irreparable injury at the end of the six-month period.
Consequently, if the board had been approached in the court's hypothetical case, and had refused to notify the dissenter in writing what
it considered the fair value of his shares, a shareholder could have
brought a representative action to compel the board to do what the
statute required; or, if the ten-day period had passed, the shareholder
could have filed a representative suit for an appraisal if the board
wrongfully refused to do so. Naturally, there is no necessity for the
statute to provide for suit by a shareholder in his representative capacity as equity has long taken jurisdiction in such cases. 49
· On another assumption, the court drew a very thin line. The dissenting shareholders argued that, even' if the statute were unconstitutional, the majority shareholders (if they were proper parties) were
estopped from relying on this defense since they had proceeded to
authorize a sale of corporate assets under the very statute which they
were now attacking as unconstitutional. Section 8623-65 of the Ohio
General Code authorizes the sale, lease, exchange or other disposal of
all or substantially all of the corporate assets and provides for the
procedure to be followed. As part of this section, it is provided that
"Dissenting shareholders, whether or not entitled to vote, shall be
entitled to relief in the manner and under the conditions hereinafter
provided." This obviously refers to section 8623-72, which is the only
section involving remedies in such cases. The majority judges thought
that these sections were separate and distinct, covering different subj ects. The fact remains, however, that the majority shareholders, in
order to sell, had to agree to the remedies provided for dissenters.
One could not go without the other. Hart and Myers, JJ., dissenting,
thought that no distinction could be made between the two sections and
that an estoppel should have been raised. It is submitted that the
minority judges solved this problem with an eye to substance rather
than to form. The majority :would not insist upon having but one section of the statute and that section containing the authorization to sell,
to the stockholder can be fairly said to be irreparable reasonably follows from the later
Supreme Court decisions." 89 F. (2d) at 662.
49 See Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331 at 341 et seq. (1855).
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the procedure, and the remedies. How section 8623-65 could have
been made more nearly a part of section 8623-72 without putting both
in one section is difficult to see.
The analysis of the Voeller case has been intentionally detailed and
searching. The Ohio statute, it is believed, is an adequate solution of
this important problem. Other jurisdictions wishing to try a similar
method ought not to be frightened by what the Ohio Supreme Court
has said in this case. 50 In fact, the weakness of the arguments in support of the statute's unconstitutionality gives some assurance that legislation of a similar kind will fare better than did the Ohio statute in this
case of first impression in the Ohio court. The fact that a conclusive
presumption is raised as one means of settling a difficult matter does
not, and should not, constitute a red traffic light stopping all progress
in this direction.

Is There a Reasonable Solution?
The answer to this question depends upon the various factors that
must be considered in problems involving fundamental change in corporate matters and the degree to which certain of these factors are
emphasized. If an agreement can be reached upon their relative importance, it is believed that a reasonable solution can be found.
What are the considerations of importance in the determination of.
desirable procedures to be followed in appraisal provisions? Having
determined that appraisal and purchase of dissenting shares are desirable objectives in the balancing of interests between the modern corporation with its tremendous powers to make change and the shareholder who is unwilling to keep his stake in the company when there
is radical change, the first problem is to state definitely the circumstances under which the dissenting shareholder may demand an appraisal and the conditions precedent which he must meet before he has
made out a case. Whether the shareholder be given the right of appraisal only in cases of merger and consolidation, as in California, 51
or be given a rather full armory of rights which permit appraisal in
most cases of fundamental change, as in Ohio, 52 are questi_ons which
50
Rhode Island adopted an appraisal section following the general policy of the
Ohio section. See R. I. Gen. Laws (1938), c. II6, § 56.
51
See supra, note 4.
52 See supra, p. I I 73 and accompanying notes. The clause used in the Ohio statute
that "unless the articles otherwise provide," etc., the shareholder has this right, leaves
the matter to the draftsman of the articles. It is thus considered a matter of contract·
with which local policy is not concerned unless the draftsman (should we say?) has
failed in his duty. For an analysis of specific statutes, see SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE
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local policy can alone determine. Fundamentally, it is a choice between
reasonable flexibility of corporate action on the one hand and security
of investment on the other. All fundamental change involves some
risk to present shareholders. If, with his eyes open, the shareholder has
contracted to waive the risk upon the vote of a certain percentage of.
his fellow shareholders, there would seem to be no policy to protect
him by giving him the choice of staying in or of obtaining an appraisal.
The Ohio act, for example, contains the clause that "Unless the articles
otherwise provide, any dissenting shareholder, who shall not have
voted in favor of the proposals herein mentioned," et cetera, shall be
paid the fair cash value of his shares. 53 The Ohio policy is clearly
stated and permits the shareholder, through statement in the articles,
to contract away this right which otherwise is his. Since the theory that
the articles form an important part of the shareholder's contract is well
established, there is no injustice in holding him to his contract. 54
In the determination of what policy ought to be favored, there
should be a careful analysis of the various possible fundamental changes
and their probable e:ffect upon the desirability of remaining a shareholder after the change is made. This, it may be claimed, is an im:..
possible task, for the specific conditions under which the particular
fundamental change is made determine whether one should remain a
shareholder or whether he should •demand appraisal and payment.
While to a large extent this is true, there are certain fundamental
changes that have acquired a reputation of inherent danger to the
shareholder and, for the sake of keeping his investment secure, it
seems desirable that he be given the choice of remaining with or departing from his company. Within this category merger and consolidation, reorganization, the wiping out of accrued but unpaid dividends,
and the placing of a prior preferred stock before an outstanding issue
of preferred arguably come. Whether the sale, lease, exchange or other
CoMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WoRK, AcTIVITIEs,
PERSONNEL AN:D FuNcTioNs OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION CoMMITTEES, Part
VII, p. 592 et seq. (1938).
53 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-72 (italics added).
54 The writer realizes that there are dangers in any doctrine which charges shareholders (or others) with notice of what the articles or the statute contains. The line,
however, must be drawn at some point. If a more paternalistic attitude is desired, the
statute could require notice in prospectus and upon the certificate of the fact that the
right to appraisal and payment has, by charter, been contracted away. The same feeling
of paternalism would require notice to the effect that, upon a majority (or other
proportionate) vote of designated classes of shares certain fundamental changes could
be made. It is submitted that this would be, to put it mildly, somewhat impractical.
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disposal of all or substantially all of the corporate assets demands the
same treatment is more debatable. If this type of transaction is merely
one of a number of steps toward eventual dissolution, there would seem
to be no good reason for giving an appraisal. If it is for the primary
purpose of creating a merger, consolidation or reorganization, then an
appraisal ought to be possible. 55 The statutes which give the right of
appraisal in such cases perhaps proceed upon the idea that generally
dissolution is not contemplated in the usual case of sale, lease, etc.,
of the assets. In the case of amendments to the articles providing for
fundamental change in the character of the corporation or in the
shareholder's interest, substantial changes in the purposes of the corporation or substantial prejudice to the shareholder ought to be the
test. 56 There may be some loss in flexibility of corporate action by granting too much leeway to the dissenting shareholder, but it seems to the
writer that present tendencies which permit almost unlimited corporate
change through majority vote ought at least to be balanced by giving
the dissenter a right to appraisal if he prefers this to going along with
the majority.
In the determination of what conditions precedent must be met
before the shareholder may, under the circumstances, obtain an appraisal, the necessity of prompt action on the part of the corporation
and of adequate notice to the shareholder so that he may act intelligently are important considerations. The corporation must know within
a reasonably short time how many shareholders there are who insist
upon being paid off so that the plan can be promptly abandoned if the
drain on the corporate treasury will be too great. If the plan concerns
merger, consolidation or reorganization, it is even more important to
have prompt notice and some procedure for foreclosing dilatory practices by striking shareholders. Proper underwriting arrangements cannot otherwise be secured. 57 In general, the shareholder should have a
55 On the use of these devices to accomplish the ends named, the article by Hills,
"Consolidation of Corporations by Sale of Assets and Distribution of Shares," 19 CAL.
L. REv. 349 (1931), is instructive.
56 The Ohio statute is significant on this point. See Gen. Code (Page, Supp.
1940), § 8623-14 (1) and (3).
Messrs. Ballantine and Sterling suggested that if minority shareholders are permitted too many outlets t_hrough appraisal possibilities, corporations may be "driven
to incorporate under the Delaware law." Ballantine and Sterling, "Upsetting Mergers
and Consolidations: Alternative Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California,"
27 CAL. L. REv. 644 at 672 (1939).
5
1lbid., at 647.
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longer time between notice and corporate · action than the statutes
today give him. 58 However, in cases of necessity, there should be
enough elasticity in the notice requirement to permit the corporation
to act though some injury may be done to minority ·rights. Without
exception the statutes should require a complete disclosure of what
is being done and why, with a sufficient disclosure of material facts to
make intelligible to every shareholder the position of his corporation
before and afte~ the contemplated action. It would be wise policy to
require the notice to inform the shareholder of his right to appraisal
if he disagrees with the majority and of what he must do to put himself in a position to demand payment. In the usual case he waives his
right to an appraisal by voting for the particular fundamental change.
Generally it is not required that he vote against it. Normally he must
object in writing within the short period set out in the statute, demand
the value of his share and occasionally he must state what he considers
its value. 59 Thus far the courts have required him to dot every "i" and
cross every "t" in complying with the conditions precedent; otherwise
he will lose his right. 60
It would seem desirable to permit the dissenting shareholder to
make his demand after ( rather than before) the shareholders' meeting
at which the resolution or amendment is carried, for he ought to have
the benefit of whatever arguments are presented pro or con at the
meeting. Whether he should be required to state in his notice the value
of his shares is doubtful. He has not the means of knowing their value
except where the statute provides for payment of the market value
58 The statutes vary. A 20-day notice is required in some states. Michigan and
California have such requirements. New York and Ohio have general provisions concerning notices which, in New York, may be as short as 10 days before the meeting
and in Ohio, if the articles so provide, a notice of less than 10 days is possible. Indiana
requires at least lo days notice and Minnesota at least two weeks. There seems to be
no general following of notice requirements taken from any particular statute. It would
seem to the writer that a 20-day notice should be the minimum, so important are the
consequences that may result. See S. E. C., REPORT, cited supra note 52,.at p. 602.
59 The usual pattern does not require the shareholder to state what he considers
the value of his shares. Some statutes require that the shareholder's demand be given
before the meeting, if notice is given within a specified time before the meeting. The
New York statute is interesting in this respect. It would be interesting to chart the
various provisions of the several states, but neither time nor space permits. To those
interested in such a chart, PARKER'S CoRPORATION MANUAL, latest edition, will be
found useful. Also, see S. E. C. REPORT, cited supra note 52, at p. 598 et seq.
60 Johnson v. C. Brigham Co., 126 Me. 108, 136 A. 456 (1927); Stephenson v.
Commonwealth & Southern Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 447, 168 A. 211 (1933); Geiger v.
American Seeding Machine Co., 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N. E. 594 (1931); In re
Camden Trust Co., 121 N. J. L. 222, 1 A. (2d) 475 (1938).

APPRAISAL STATUTES

and there is a market large enough to indicate this. If he is required to
state what he considers their value, the tendency will be to state a larger
figure than he can expect to get or to state their par value. However,
there is some practical advantage in requiring him to do this, as the
corporation may be quite willing to pay somewhat more for his shares
than it deems them worth in order to avoid what may be an expensive
proceeding. It also gives a basis for negotiation and compromise. The
corporation is in a better position to state to him what it considers the
true value of his shares. There may be some danger that the corporation will put the figure ?,t a lower point than what it considers the true
value in order to have a bargaining leverage in dealing with the shareholder's claim. But, whether the shareholder be required to state what
he deems to be the value or whether that burden be placed upon tlie
corporation, there must be a point at which a deadlock of negotiations
ends either in a conclusive presumption of value or in a compulsory proceeding for appraisal. The Ohio statute uses the first method. It is
intended in the first instance to put the burden upon the shareholder
to state what he considers the true value; then, upon the corporation
to reply by stating what it considers the value; then, upon the passing
of a six-month period, to make the corporation's figure the true value
by a conclusive presumption if the shareholder ( or the corporation) has
not brought a suit to have an appraisal; if the corporation fails to reply
by stating its consideration of value, a conclusive presumption is raised
that the shareholder has named its value. This is simple, understandable, and workable. Perhaps six months is too long a period to leave
this important question in the air. A reasonable time ought to be permitted so that the shareholder may have a chance to make an investigation, if he so desires, of those things which go into the determination
of value. 61
It may be argued that the setting up of a conclusive presumption
either in favor of shareholder or corporation is a trap for the unwary. 62 It is no more of a trap than numerous other statutory or common-law requirements that warn one that he must act at his peril.
61 See Lattin, "Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes/'
45 HAR.V. L. REV. 233 at 258 et seq. (1931); S. E. C. REPORT, cited supra note 52,
at p. 590; ,American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225 (1937),
noted in I MD. L. REv. 338 (1937); Matter of Fulton, 257 N. Y. 487, 178 N. E.
766 (1931); Ahlenius v. Bunn & Humphreys, Inc., 358 Ill. 155, 192 N. E. 824
(1934); Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934); Republic
Finance & Investment Co. v. Fen~termaker, 2ll Ind. 251, 6 N. E. (2d) 541 (1937).
62
Paul J. Bickel, Esq., Chairman of the Committee on Corporation Law of the
Ohio State Bar Association, in a recent letter to the writer, contends as much.
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However, if this be considered a serious objection, the statute could
contain the provision suggested above requiring the giving of a notice
to the shareholder of his appraisal rights and of the conclusive presumption which will work against him if he fails to act. Certainly the
corporation is in a position to determine the legal obligations attending
its failure to act. Perhaps it should be given more than ten days after
the receipt of the shareholder's demands in which to make reply, as the
board will have to convene to make up the corporate mind. But that is
a matter of detail which is easily ironed out by ascertaining what is a
reasonable time in such cases.
If the corporation contends that the particular shareholder is not
entitled to appraisal and finds itself faced with the possibility of a conclusive presumption if it does not promptly act and state its opinion of
the stock's true value, it undoubtedly may, under the Ohio act, state
its contention that the shareholder is not entitled to appraisal and at the
same time protect itself against error in this contention by stating the
value of the shares to be such and such. Whether the corporation expresses its contention or not would seem to be unimportant under the
Ohio statute, as the court must first determine ccfrom the petition and
such evidence as may be submitted by either party whether the dissenting shareholder is entitled to be paid the fair cash value of any
share or shares...." 68
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the Voeller case is right
and that the conclusive presumption feature of the statute is invalid on
due process grounds, this defect can easily be cured by a provision in
the appraisal section to the effect that the shareholders consent to action
by the corporation through the board of directors in this matter. And if
one feels that the shareholder ought not to be compelled to state his
conclusions of true value, this burden may be put upon the corporation
in reply to the shareholder's demand for payment; in such case there
could be a conclusive presumption in favor of the value stated by the
corporation if the named period of time elapsed without institution of
suit for appraisal by either shareholder or corporation. The writer believes that this is the most practical approach to this problem from
both the corporation's and the shareholder's standpoints. There is no
arbitrariness about such a procedure and there is a finality and certainty
in every step which works for a prompt consummation. In this type
of business transaction these are important considerations.
68

Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938) § 8623-72, par.
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Conclusions

While there are some practical advantages to be gained by making
the remedy by appraisal exclusive, thus barring dissenting shareholders
from enjoining proposed action or overturning consummated plans
where the dissenters are not guilty of laches, it is believed that there
is much to be said for the opposite view. But to make this effective the
statutes must require notice to all shareholders a sufficient length of
time before the vote is taken and with a breadth of detail which will
truly inform them of the proposed action so that they may intelligently
act, either to ask for an appraisal or to bring suit to enjoin. If appraisal
is to be an exclusive remedy, then some device should be provided that
will act as a restraining influence on the majority to prevent unjust
and fraudulent action. 64
In either case, such a statute must be practical. It must inform both
the corporation and the dissenting shareholder of the exact rights which
each has. 65 The corporation must know within a reasonable time before
64 See notes 23 and 24a, supra. Ballantine and Sterling, "Upsetting Mergers and
Consolidations: Alternative Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California," 27
CAL. L. REv. 644 at 668-672 (1939), make these suggestions: (1) administrative
supervision over fundamental changes, putting the burden upon the majority to prove
the fairness of the particular change; (2) as an alternative proposal, the authorization
of some governmental agency as a representative of shareholders whose duty it would
be to investigate and to bring actions to protect investors, this to be exclusive of individual shareholder suits; (3) something similar to the British Shareholders' Protective
Association to protect investors, in the absence of official representation; (4) protective
measures through complete information upon the fundamental change contemplated
similar to the full information required by the Security and Exchange Commission's
rules regulating the procuring of proxies.
65 There are other important matters which must await discussion in a future
paper. The problem whether to treat the dissenter as a shareholder during the interim
between his demand for payment and the actual payment and surrender of his shares or
the company's abandonment of the plan is a difficult one. Should he be paid interest
on the value of his shares during this period, if not treated as a shareholder? What
about cash and stock dividends? Should he vote? What of those who purchase dissenters'
shares without notice of the demands made by their predecessors in title? Should there
be a requirement to earmark such shares? Is there some short cut to determine what is
the "fair value" or "fair cash value," perhaps through definition? Is the term "market
value" to be preferred? Should the corporation be required to put up security for the
payment of dissenting shareholders before consummating the fundamental change?
Should shareholders be allowed to withdraw their demands with or without the consent of the corporation? By whom shall the appraisal be made? When shall it become
.final and payable? Who shall pay for its cost? Some of these were discussed in an
earlier paper by the writer, "Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal
Statutes," 45 HARV. L. REV. 233 (1931), the statutes existing at the time being
particularly discussed.
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consummation of a merger, consolidation, amendment to the articles or
sale of all or a substantial part of the assets (if appraisal is permitted
in all these cases) just how many dissenting shareholders will have
to be paid off. It is important to have this knowledge promptly so that
the corporation can decide to go ahead or turn back if it seems desirable.
It is also wise as a practical matter to have some point at which the
corporation and the shareholder may know that no further action by
either is possible-that, for the purpose of determining the price to be
paid for the dissenter's shares, a set value will be conclusive unless some
action toward appraisal is taken before a reasonable period of time,
specified in the statute, has elapsed. The courts have wisely held that
if the shareholder has no cause to enjoin or to set aside ap.d if he fails
to comply with the conditions precedent to appraisal, he must go along
with the majority as if he had consented to the particular fundamental
change. 66 There is no more reason why the corporation or the shareholder should not be bound where either fails to act and the statute
raises a conclusive presumption of value. Not only is this a practical
way of solving this important matter but it is a just way. And, the
writer submits, there is nothing unconstitutional about it if well established principles qf the law of corporations are understood and applied.
66 See Beechwood Securities Corp., Inc. v. Associated Oil Co., (C. C. A. 9th,
1939) 104 F. (2d) 537; Littrell v. Craig, (D. C. Pa. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 491, noted
in 81 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 625 (1933). Bari;ing other statutory or common-law remedies
that the particular jurisdiction permits, it seems clear that the legislatures of the
various states intended to permit appraisal or to require the shareholder to accept what
the majority shareholders have provided. But see In re Duer, 270 N. Y. 343, I
N. E. (2d) 457 (1936), and note in 85 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 324 (1937).

